

SRG

19 JUNE 75

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DONE BY BUFFUM

19 June 1975

DCI BRIEFING FOR
19 JUNE SRG MEETING

ANGOLA

- I. The current situation in Angola is highly unstable. Rivalry between contending nationalist groups has featured increasing violence, with each group trying to stake out territory and gain military superiority before independence on November 11.
 - A. The fighting over the past few months has been between the two largest groups, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, led by Agostinho Neto, and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola led by Holden Roberto. A third group, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, led by Jonas Savimbi, has largely kept out of the fighting.
 1. In action early this month Neto's Popular Movement secured an advantage in

some areas north and east of Luanda, thus blocking the National Front's supply lines from northern Angola and Zaire into the capital.

2. The Popular Movement already had important tribal support in these areas during the years of insurgency against the Portuguese.
3. Neto's Popular Movement also has gained an edge in the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda.
4. The two main groups remain in a standoff position in Luanda itself.
5. Roberto's National Front still remains strongly entrenched in northern Angola where it has substantial tribal support. In that area it seems well able to withstand any Popular Front attacks.
6. There have been some reports of new clashes this week on other rural areas, but it is not yet clear just what has happened.

B. There are a number of factors that can cause new fighting at any time:

- The continuing buildup of the military forces of the three nationalist groups;
- The introduction of heavier weapons -- mortars and bazookas -- into Angola;
- The presence of armed and undisciplined civilians in Luanda fight in behalf of the Popular Movement;
- The inability or unwillingness of either major group to exercise effective control over its own forces; and
- Attempts by all three groups to seek control of areas of Angola yet untouched by the fighting and where no single group has an edge.

C. Cabinda remains a flashpoint. Despite the MPLA's slight military edge in the territory, but both other groups also have forces active there.

1. All three groups want the enclave to remain a part of an independent Angola.
2. The picture is complicated by the presence of a separatist movement supported by both Zaire and Congo.

3. Both countries have endorsed Cabindan independence, and any intensification of the fighting there could bring outside intervention.

II. The transitional government installed last January has proved unworkable.

A. It is constructed on a system of checks and balances, but in the current climate members of the three liberation groups, as government officials, work at odds with each other.

1. Portuguese officials are not effective, because they are caught in the middle.
2. Above all, the liberation groups have not honored their commitment to establish the integrated national army that was called for in the independence accord.

B. As for the Portuguese military forces, the 24,000 Portuguese troops are mostly kept in Luanda.

1. The Portuguese have in effect abandoned most of the countryside to the nationalists and are already crating some of

their heavy equipment for shipment to Lisbon.

2. Portuguese forces are scheduled to begin withdrawal in October and are to be totally removed by next February.
3. There is nothing in the independence accord to prevent the Portuguese from withdrawing as fast as they can after October.

III. The role of outside powers in supplying military assistance to the nationalist groups remains a key factor.

A. The Soviet Union has been a long time supporter of Neto's Popular Movement, providing both arms and cash during the years of the insurgency against the Portuguese.

1. We are unable to determine how much Soviet military aid is now reaching the Movement, but it seems to have enabled the Movement to score some gains during the recent fighting.
2. Most of the aid is being channeled through the Congo.

B. Peking has had some association with all of the liberation movements in the past, but

the Chinese are most closely associated with the National Front.

1. They have supplied military equipment as well as some training. Some 100 Chinese advisers may now be in Zaire working with the Front.
2. Chinese assistance has helped the Front to establish its forces firmly in northern Angola.

C. Roberto has had little success in finding assistance elsewhere for the Front.

1. Zaire's President Mobutu has loose family ties with Roberto and has long supported him. Recently, however, Mobutu has cut back his assistance to the Front because of his government's serious financial problems.
 - a. Mobutu is also cooling toward Roberto. He is alarmed over the Front's recent setbacks and feels Roberto's position has been damaged because he has remained in Zaire.
 - b. Mobutu now believes Jonas Savimbi

of the National Union should be
the primary figure in an inde-
pendent Angolan government.

IV. The prospects for Angola between now and November are poor. Further violence is likely and may edge the territory closer to civil war. At best, Angola will lurch along and become independent without a strong single leader.

A. Elections for a constituent assembly, supposed to be held in October, may well be postponed.

1. The assembly was to select a head of government to assume office upon independence.

B. Savimbi, Roberto, and Neto have been meeting this week in Kenya to try and dampen tensions and thrash out some agreement on who will assume what office upon independence.

1. The odds are greatly against any new and fundamental understanding among the three.

2. At this point, it seems unlikely that they will do much more than negotiate an uncertain truce that might delay a confrontation until after independence.

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BACKUP FOR
19 JUNE SRG MEETING

ZAIRE

- I. Zaire's declaration of Ambassador Hinton as persona non grata followed several days of heavy anti-US propaganda in the controlled media that included an attack on Secretary Kissinger. The campaign was highlighted by President Mobutu's speech to a mass audience in Kinshasa yesterday.
 - A. The Zairian foreign minister told Hinton there was clear evidence of US involvement in a coup plot against Mobutu. A number of middle and high-ranking military officers were recently arrested for allegedly plotting an attempt on Mobutu's life.
 1. Two of the officers who were arrested received training at Fort Leavenworth and another had recently returned to Kinshasa after serving as military attache in Washington.

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II. At this point, Mobutu's motives remain a mystery. Short-lived anti-US outbursts on his part are not uncommon, but his fits of pique have never gone to this extreme.

A. Mobutu has long tried to erase his pro-US image now that he is securely in power. He is also said to believe that the US is no longer a dependable ally and may have decided the time was ripe to assert his independence more forcefully.

B. Mobutu [redacted] may be overreacting to any one of a number of situations.

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1. He is alarmed by the rising violence in Angola and may feel his ability to influence developments there is slipping. He has been unable to convince the US to take a more active role there by supporting Robert's Liberation Front.
2. He may feel frustrated because he has serious financial problems and has had almost no success in finding large-scale foreign assistance.

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3. Inflation, shortages of consumer goods, and other economic problems have produced grumbling in the army, which has not been a problem in the past few years. He may have felt it necessary to invent a plot to warn any potential conspirators.

III. Whatever point Mobutu is trying to make, he will probably let the matter rest here. It seems most unlikely that he will go to the extreme of breaking relations.

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